Actually, if Saddam were still in power, he'd be providing a counterweight to Iran. This is not a call for Saddam's restoration but an argument in favor of also making sure, by whatever means necessary, that Iran does not acquire nukes.
Coyne is right. We've lost the nerve to deal with these situations. I really really hate to say this but, at this point, nothing but the use of a weapon of mass destruction against a Western target even has the chance of sounding our wake-up call.
If N. Korea really can detonate a nuke ( there seems to be some doubt) and since the country is so dirt-poor, the sale of nuclear weapons to rogue states or rabid islamists could become a major source of foreign earnings.
That worries me enormously.
The only way to deal (effectively) with the Norks at this point is to freeze trade, both inbound and outbound. A lack of food (and oil imports) is just about the only lever outsiders have, since the Dear Leader has already deprived his people of just about everything else. NK doesn't produce anything that the rest of the world wants, or that can be turned into hard currency, except missle technolgy and (perhaps) atomic weapons and technology - those can too easily be hidden in a container (or the technology -but not the goods- can be smuggled out by e-mail or on a thumb drive), hence the need to embargo outbound shipping.
Unfortunately, I doubt that this will work - the Chinese are almost as afraid of a destabilized NK and a wave of refugees as they are of a nuclear nutbar on their doorstep, while the South Koreans have that and possible (and undoubtedly devastating) attacks on Seoul to worry about. I expect that neither of them would agree to an embargo that may topple the Kimster; and without them, an embargo (or the even less effective "trade sanctions") is an empty glass.
Heck, I (generally) support the Administration, and I also think that NK wants nukes as leverage more than to attack the South.
The South already sucks up to NK and couldn't plausibly invade in the face of massed NK artillery and fortified passes - which it doesn't want to anyway, and the NKs know it (as well as they know anything, at least. NK irrationality is legendary and at least partially factual).
Attacking South Korea would be suicidally disastrous for North Korea. Having a bomb to pressure SK, China, and Japan with is a lot less stupid (possibly as non-stupid as any available action that preserves the Kim regime, which is of course Kim's goal - many "better" solutions exist in terms of world safety, peace with its neighbors, and prosperity for the people of North Korea, but those solutions threaten Kim's personal power, either directly and immediately, or over the long run, and thus he has no desire to attempt them).
Cutting off aid is a good question, but there aren't any good answers - the only outcome that doesn't create a terrible incentive and example is the one where aid is cut off and stays off until real results are gained - and I have little confidence in such a resolution lasting.
Mick Hartley has linked to some fascinating tidbits [External Link]re the N.K. political situation and its neighbors.
The explanation for S.K.'s stance is worth the read alone.